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Abstract:  This paper explores the impact and design of tax thresholds, and the light this 
casts on notions of ‘informality.’ It shows how thresholds generate partitions of the 
population of potential taxpayers by different forms of compliance and non-compliance. 
The richness of these partitions means one should resist thinking of ‘the informal sector’ 
as an undifferentiated mass, but instead recognize that there are quite distinct varieties of 
informality with potentially very different policy implications. We characterize the forces 
shaping such taxpayer partitions, and, within that setting, the optimal threshold and the 
partitions it induces. The analysis is extended to the (realistic) case in which taxpayers 
face multiple tax (or other) obligations, showing how a threshold on one obligation 
affects partitioning and optimal threshold choice with respect to the other.  
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I.   Introduction 
This paper aims to establish and explore the links between two threads in the public 
finance literature.  One is the use of tax thresholds to partition taxpayers1 into those who 
are liable to pay tax and those who are not.  The other is the notion of ‘informality’ as a 
central challenge for tax design and implementation, especially, but not only, in 
developing countries.  The two are intimately related because making sense of 
‘informality’ as a concept requires recognizing that it subsumes a range of non-compliant 
(and compliant) behaviors with the tax threshold being a primary determinant of those 
behaviors; and so, by the same token, the setting of thresholds needs to recognize the 
potentially complex impact on the extent and nature of ‘informality.’  Using a highly 
stylized model to formalize these ideas, the central analytical purpose of the paper is to 
characterize partitions of taxpayers by different types of compliance and non-compliance, 
show how this is shaped by the level of the threshold, and explore the implications for the 
optimal choice of threshold2 and associated partition—and hence, more loosely, for 
optimal informality. 
 
Most taxes (though not all) have some threshold below which no tax is payable, the 
fundamental rationale being simply that costs of administration (to the tax authorities) 
and of compliance (to the taxpayer) argue against imposing taxes on the smallest 
taxpayers.  These thresholds can be of two types.  They may involve a ‘kink’, in the sense 
that while the marginal tax rate switches from zero to strictly positive as the threshold is 
crossed, tax is imposed only on the amount by with the base (which we shall call 
‘income’) exceeds that threshold; tax liability itself is thus continuous around the 
threshold.3  Almost all personal income taxes are of this familiar form.  The other type of 
threshold is a ‘notch’, 4 the difference being that in this case tax is charged once the 
threshold is exceeded not just on the excess over the threshold but the full amount of the 
base: tax liability thus jumps discontinuously at the notch.  Most value added taxes 
(VATs), for instance, have this feature: once a trader’s sales exceed some threshold level 
of turnover, they are required to charge VAT on all of their sales.  And there are many 
other if less obvious examples of such jumps in liability: simplified income tax regimes 
may apply, for instance, only below some income (or other) threshold.  Indeed Slemrod 
(2010) shows that such ‘notch’ structures are a much more pervasive feature of tax (and 
other) systems than is often recognized. Importantly too, even if the formal threshold 
itself is in the form of a kink, the compliance costs associated with paying some rather 
                                                 
1 We use ‘taxpayers’ as shorthand for the universe of firms or individuals (not restricting it to those who 
actually do or should pay tax). 
2 There are other considerations in the optimal choice of threshold not addressed here.  It may for instance 
be desirable to tax smaller firms, even if the costs of doing so exceed the revenue raised, in order to reduce 
the distortion of competition between taxed and untaxed firms (Keen, 2013).  Some also see political 
economy benefit in levying some charge on even the smallest taxpayers as a way of encouraging them to 
hold policy makers accountable (see for example OECD (2008)).   We abstract from these considerations 
here. 
3 It is kinks that are exploited in the seminal work of Saez (2010) on the estimation of elasticities of taxable 
income. 
4 Arrangements of this kind are sometimes also referred to as ‘slab’ or ‘cliff’ structures. 
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than no tax are likely best thought of as including some fixed component that, for the 
taxpayer, has the same effect as a tax notch 5  
 
The focus in this paper is on the notch form of threshold.  This reflects not only their 
practical importance, but also the sharpness with which they raise the key compliance 
issues with which we are concerned and, not least, the ease of comparison with previous 
work.  The impact and design of notch thresholds has received some previous attention. 
Kleven and Waseem (2013) use such a feature found (very unusually) in the personal 
income tax of Pakistan to identify the elasticity of taxable income, for instance, while 
Chatterjee and Wingender (2011) look at a similar feature of indirect taxes in India. 
Closer to current concerns, however, is work on the optimal choice of threshold of 
Dharmapala, Slemrod and Wilson (2011), Zee (2005) and—used as a benchmark in the 
analysis below—Keen and Mintz (2004).  All this literature has assumed, however, that 
all taxpayers are fully compliant.  But non-compliance with tax laws is a universal 
concern: taxpayers might, in particular, falsely declare under the threshold (or simply not 
report), or declare above the threshold but below their true liability.  
 
One key task here is to extend previous analyses of tax thresholds to allow for such non-
compliance.  What partitions, in terms of different behavioral responses, does a notch 
threshold induce?  How do these partitions of tax compliance change when the threshold                                
changes?  And what is the optimal threshold?  A useful reference point for this last 
question is provided by a simple formula for the optimal VAT threshold derived by Mintz 
and Keen (2004) for the case in which not only are all compliant, but their outputs are 
fixed and perfectly observable to the authorities, the natural question, addressed here, 
then being:  Recognizing these different types of compliance and non-compliance, is the 
optimal threshold higher or lower than that simple rule implies?  
 
One other and previously neglected aspect of threshold choice is also taken up here.  
Such attention as the issue has received presumes that firms face only one obligation and, 
so, only one threshold. In practice, they often face multiple obligations and, 
correspondingly, may well face multiple thresholds.  This may be true simply in tax 
terms—distinct thresholds for the VAT and a presumptive income tax, for instance—but 
can also arise because firms also face non-tax obligations: the requirements of labor law, 
for instance.  The question then is how a threshold in relation to one obligation affects 
partitions in respect of another, and how that in turn affects the optimal levels of the 
various thresholds.  
 
These questions of threshold design and impact also speak to the concept of ‘informality’ 
as it is used in the public finance literature—the second thread with which we are 
                                                 
5 It is an essentially universal empirical finding that compliance costs relative to some indicator of size tend 
to fall with that indicator, and quite sharply at smaller sizes, so that any reasonable approximation of 
compliance costs will include a substantial fixed component.  See, of many possible examples, European 
Commission (2004) and, for developing countries, Coolidge (2012).  There is of course a large and growing 
literature on different types of tax or regulatory regimes which induce kinks and discontinuities of different 
types in incentive structures:  see for example, in addition to Saez (2010), Bastani and Selin (2012), 
Almunia and Lopez-Rodriguez (2013) and Garicano, Lalarge and van Reenen (2013). 
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concerned.6  Accounts of tax challenges in developing economies commonly put 
informality at or near the top of the list.  Auriol and Warlters (2005), for example, 
summarize the difficulties enumerated by Burgess and Stern (1993) as the single point 
that “developing countries have large informal sectors that are difficult to tax”; Keen and 
Simone (2004) similarly highlight that “informality is extensive,” and “[t]axing the 
informal economy” leads the African Development Bank’s list of policy priorities 
(Mubiru, 2010).  The term is prominent in policy discourse in developed countries too: 
IMF (2013) refers to the “large size of the informal economy” in Greece as a source of 
“low revenue efficiency.”  But while it is easy find statements of the importance of 
‘informality’ for tax design and implementation, it is very hard to find clear definitions of 
what exactly it is.  
 
The technical literature tends to model ‘informality’ simply as non-remittance of tax.  But 
there are many reasons why tax might not be remitted, a point that—linking the two 
themes of the paper—thinking about tax thresholds makes abundantly clear.  A threshold 
creates an obvious distinction between those who end up above the threshold and those 
who end up below.  But there also marked and, as will be seen, potentially policy-
relevant and threshold-driven differences within each of these groups.  Those who end up 
remitting no tax, for instance, may be of three types:  those whose maximum potential 
income is below the tax threshold; those whose potential income exceeds the threshold 
but who, perfectly legally, adjust down to just below the threshold in order to avoid tax; 
and those whose actual income is above the threshold but who falsely and illegally claim 
to have income below the threshold.  These three types of behavior evidently have very 
different implications for output, welfare and policy design:  it is not simply the fact of 
non-remittance of tax that matters, but the reason it occurs.  Notions of informality that 
miss such distinctions risk muddled analysis. 
 
Elaborating on this, a central argument of this paper is that lumping various categories of 
compliant and non-compliant tax behavior under the single label ‘informality,’ trying to 
summarize it in a single quantitative measure, and presuming that ‘it’ is a problem is both 
analytically problematic and potentially highly misleading for policy purposes.  What is 
important is to recognize the varieties of informality and how each responds to policy 
instruments.  It will be seen, for instance, that the setting of optimal thresholds may well 
involve balancing a reduction in some types of informality against an increase in others—
and perhaps even increasing, on some measures, its overall extent.  Recognizing the 
multiplicity of obligations that taxpayers commonly face, with their associated 
                                                 
6 The perspective that we take on informality in this paper is thus very much tax-driven.  There are of 
course others.  There is, in particular, a long-standing interest in informality from a labor perspective:  see 
the discussion in Kanbur (2009) and Chatterjee and Kanbur (2013). These differing perspectives can lead to 
quite different notions of ‘informality.’  For instance, OECD (2009), focusing on employment aspects, 
speaks of “Shoe shine workers in Cairo, street vendors in Calcutta: this is informal employment.”  That is 
perfectly reasonable from a labor market perspective; from a public finance perspective, however, it is far 
from clear that one would actually want these groups to charge VAT or remit income tax, and they may 
indeed be fully (or almost) tax compliant.  Others will think of informality spanning a range of aspects of 
behavior, associated for instance with limited book-keeping, heavy reliance on cash transactions and the 
like.  All this creates further difficulties and imprecision in the use of the term.  
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thresholds, will be seen to point even more strongly to the need for a more subtle and 
holistic approach to notions of informality, compliance and partitioning. 
 
The plan of the paper is as follows:  Section II sets out a simple model that enables an 
endogenous partitioning of taxpayers in terms of compliant and non-compliant behaviors, 
and explores how this partitioning depends on the level of the threshold.  It also applies 
these results to the issues in conceptualizing informality just raised.  Section III then 
characterizes the optimal threshold, again drawing implications for understanding and 
addressing the varieties of informality.  Section IV extends the analysis to the case of two 
tax regimes, each with its own possible threshold, analyzes cross-effects on compliance 
across the two, and considers whether or not it is optimal to have a common threshold for 
both.  Section V concludes. 
 
 
II.   A Partition of taxpayers 
This section sets out a framework enabling a unified treatment of different forms of 
compliance and non-compliance in the presence of a notch threshold for tax liability.  
 
A simple model 
 
We consider a population of individuals differing in the maximum potential income7 they 
can earn (without effort or any other costs)¸ denoted Y, which is taken to be exogenous 
and distributed continuously with density ݂ሺܻሻ and twice differentiable distribution 
function ܨሺܻሻ	on support ሾ0,∞ሻ,and population size normalized at unity.8  They can, if 
they wish, choose to earn any amount less than this; they can also choose what income to 
reveal to the government.  Their objective in all this is simply to maximize their income 
after tax and other costs. 
 
The tax system is of the ‘notch’ form:  income above some threshold ܼ is taxable in its full 
amount (not just that part above Z).  The role and, later, choice of this threshold will be the 
central focus in what follows.  Those remitting any strictly positive amount of tax, it is 
assumed, also incur fixed compliance costs of ܭ ൐ 0.	In practice, of course, compliance 
costs are likely to increase with the extent and complexity of a taxpayer’s business.  Taking 
them to be the same for all is a simple way of capturing the increasingly well-documented 
stylized fact noted at the outset, that these costs decrease markedly relative to the scale of 
activity.  The marginal tax rate T is assumed constant,9 so that the net income of a fully 
compliant taxpayer with income above the threshold is	ሺ1 െ ܶሻܻ െ ܭ. 
                                                 
7 For definiteness, the discussion is for the most part cast in terms of ‘individuals’ or ‘firms’ and ‘income,’ 
but clearly many interpretations are possible. 
8 This is in the spirit of related treatments in which entrepreneurs differ in ability and make some costly 
input choice (such as Dabla Norris, Gradstein and Inchauste (2008) and Keen and Mintz (2004)).  This 
approach would lead to cut-offs of the kind discussed below but defined in terms of ability rather than 
potential income.  The simpler representation of output decisions here facilitates analysis of the somewhat 
involved choice between the multiple regimes about to be described.  
9 This of course is in order to abstract from distinct effects arising from the shape of the tax schedule. For 
developing countries, there is evidence—now rather dated, but still plausible (Gautier and Gersovitz 
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While for clarity we speak of Y here as ‘income,’ most income taxes, of course, are not of 
this notch form, but rather levy tax only on the amount ܻ െ ܼ above the threshold, not on 
Y itself.  Almost all value added taxes, however, do have precisely this notch feature, and 
the structure here is readily re-interpreted in that way.10  The rationale for considering a 
notch structure is not realism in describing income taxes but rather to capture the 
pervasiveness of notches in tax codes (and in regulatory ones too), stressed by Slemrod 
(2009), and to enable later results to be related to earlier analyses of taxpayer partitioning 
under much simpler circumstances in Keen and Mintz (2004).  It is important too to note 
that while the hallmark of the notch tax structure is that it introduces a discontinuity in 
net income when the threshold is crossed, fixed compliance costs induce such a 
discontinuity even in the absence of a notch in the tax structure itself.  
 
Faced with this tax system, individuals choose between four types of behavior: they may 
earn and declare their true potential income (and be above or below the threshold 
accordingly); they may genuinely reduce their income to below the threshold; they may 
dishonestly opt out of the tax system entirely; or they may earn their full potential income 
but declare less.  To focus on the extensive margin of the choice between these behaviors, 
we effectively abstract from the intensive margin within each: that is, once the choice of 
regime is made, there is no substantive decision to be made as to true or declared income. 
 
Fully honest taxpayers in this setting are, thus, potentially, of three types.  There are those 
with maximum potential income below the threshold, who declare truthfully and pay no 
tax—this is what one might expect of ‘micro’ traders, so we refer to these as type M. 
There are those who truthfully declare above the threshold—type L.  And there are those 
whose maximum income is above the threshold but who choose to save tax and 
compliance costs by reducing their income and truthfully declaring just below the 
threshold11—we call these adjusters, type A.  The existence of this last option means that 
there will be a ‘hole’ above the threshold:  a range of income over which—as a 
consequence of both fixed compliance costs and the notch tax structure—adjusting to 
below the threshold leads to higher net income. 
 
Types M, L, and A are all, in different ways, fully compliant.  But we also allow for the 
two different forms of non-compliance mentioned above.  
 
One is to opt out of the tax system by either becoming invisible to the tax authorities—a 
‘ghost’—or by falsely declaring just under the threshold.  This though, we assume, 
involves some real cost, 12 perhaps through the need to earn or hide income in convoluted 
                                                                                                                                                 
(1997), Gauthier and Reinnika (2001))—that larger firms benefit more from exemptions, which would 
reinforce the pattern of compliance derived below. 
10 In this case (and ignoring input costs) Y would be interpreted as potential sales revenue, with the 
assumption that this is independent of the tax system corresponding to an assumption that the consumer 
price is fixed—as would be the case, for instance, in a small economy open to trade in the commodity/ies of 
interest. 
11 To keep things manageable, we preclude the possibility of splitting activity between more than one unit 
below the threshold (the legality of which will depend on the grouping rules for the tax in question). 
12 For the welfare part of the analysis, it is assumed that these costs imply a real reduction in income, and 
are not simply a transfer. 
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ways so as to escape notice, so that net income is in this case reduced to ሺ1 െ ߛሻܻ—we 
call these type B, for bounders—capturing both their ungentlemanly behavior and the 
notion that they may be falsely presenting their income as below the lower bound for 
liability.13  It is assumed throughout that 1 ൐ 	ߛ ൐ ܶ: without this, there could be no 
honest taxpayers.  
 
The other type of non-compliance is to declare only some proportion ߣ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ of true 
income—the same proportion, we assume, for all taxpayers—incurring, in doing so, 
some total cost Γሺܻሻܻ, with Γሺܻሻ non-negative, increasing, convex and differentiable.14 
So net income in this case is ሺ1 െ ߣܶ െ Γሺܻሻሻܻ െ ܭ.  We refer to such taxpayers as 
cads—another label of dishonor in Victorian England; type C.  The costs they incur may 
reflect, for instance, expected penalties, so that Γ	could also depend on ߣ and T ( though 
this need not be made explicit since both will be held constant in what follows); they 
might also capture bribes paid to tax inspectors, or the costs involved in (legal) 
avoidance.  The assumption that the possible degree of under-reporting ߣ	is the same for 
all is restrictive, of course, and has some implications that should be noted.  One is that 
this it may imply that some taxpayers declare an income in the ‘hole’ above the threshold 
mentioned above, so that, were that declaration honest, they would be manifestly better 
off adjusting to below the threshold—which would make them prime targets for an active 
audit strategy.  As a practical matter, this may not be too unrealistic:  when income is 
subject to some uncertainty, honest taxpayers can indeed find themselves in this range 
and tax authorities do not seem to look particularly intensely at those declaring just above 
the VAT threshold.  More awkward is that mechanical application of the rule can result in 
declared incomes that are below the threshold but nonetheless taxed; this, however, can 
be ruled out by parametric restrictions that do not involve Z.15  
  
Partitioning taxpayers 
 
Individuals choose whichever of these options gives them the highest net income.  This 
choice can be characterized in terms of various cut-off levels of income.  
 
Bounding will be strictly preferred to adjusting, for instance, if and only if 
 
ሺ1 െ ߛሻܻ ൐ ܼ																																																																		ሺ2.1ሻ 
 
which defines a cut-off level of income 
                                                 
13 Note the assumption here that the net income of those who entirely vanish from the tax system is 
independent of the threshold (one implication being that this category of behavior cannot plausibly be 
interpreted as including artificial splitting into more than one unit below the threshold) 
14 Not all models of concealment imply an increasing Γሺܻ):  in the model of corrupt tax inspection in 
Hindriks, Keen and Muthoo (1999), for example, the relationship between the equilibrium bribe and true 
income has an inverse-U shape.  But nor is the present assumption entirely implausible: an increasing Γ	is 
implied, for instance, if concealment costs are quadratic in the amount concealed.  The general approach to 
modeling concealment costs here is in the spirit of, and discussed further in, Slemrod (2001). 
15 For instance: adjusting is preferred to concealing at all income levels below ߠ஺஼ defined in (3.11) below. 
Clearly ߠ஺஼ ൐ ܼ/ሺ1 െ ߣܶሻ, so that a sufficient condition for ߠ஺஼ to exceed the highest income level, ܼ/ߣ, at 
which mechanical under-declaration would put the taxpayer under the threshold is that ߣ ൐ 1/ሺ1 ൅ ܶሻ. 
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ߠ஺஻ሺܼሻ ൌ ܼ1 െ ߛ																																																																	ሺ2.2ሻ 
 
such that all those with income above ߠ஺஻ prefer bounding to adjusting, and all those with 
lower income prefer the opposite.  (The general notation introduced here is that ߠ௃௄ 
denotes the level of income at which net income under behaviors J and K give the same 
net income). Similarly, those (having income above Z) with income ߠ஻஼ defined by 
 
൫1 െ ߣܶ െ Γሺߠ஻஼ሻ൯ߠ஻஼ െ ܭ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߛሻߠ஻஼																																											ሺ2.3ሻ 
 
are indifferent between concealing and bounding, while those with income ߠ஼௅ such that  
 
ሺ1 െ ܶሻߠ஼௅ െ ܭ ൌ ൫1 െ ߣܶ െ Γሺߠ஼௅ሻ൯ߠ஼௅ െ ܭ,																																ሺ2.4ሻ 
 
or, equivalently, such that 
 
ሺ1 െ ߣሻܶ ൌ Γሺߠ஼௅ሻ,																																																							ሺ2.5ሻ 
 
are indifferent between honesty and concealing.  From (2.3) and (2.4), those with 
incomes above ߠ஻஼ will prefer concealing to bounding, and those above ߠ஼௅ will prefer 
honesty to concealing, so long as, over the relevant range, 
 
߲ሺΓሺܻሻܻሻ
߲ܻ ∈ ሺሺ1 െ ߣሻܶ, ߛ െ ߣܶሻ,			∀ܻ,																																									ሺ2.6ሻ 
 
which we henceforth assume to be the case.16 It will also be assumed throughout that: 
 
ሺߛ െ ܶሻߠ஻஼ ൏ ܭ	,																																																										ሺ2.7ሻ 
 
which means that those indifferent between bounding and concealing prefer bounding to 
full compliance.  The restrictions in (2.6) and (2.7) are of course somewhat arbitrary.  But 
it would be tedious to consider all conceivable permutations, and these assumptions serve 
to focus attention on what seem to us likely to be the most relevant possibilities for 
practical policy design. 
 
While this covers only three of the binary comparisons that individuals need to make, it is 
enough to begin analyzing how they will be partitioned in equilibrium.  This will clearly 
depend on the threshold Z, and indeed a key part of our task here is to explore precisely 
that dependence.  To begin, suppose first—a temporary assumption, relaxed later—that 
the threshold is low enough and/or compliance costs high enough, that  
 
			ܼ ൏ ൫1 െ ߣܶ െ ߁ሺߠ஻஼ሻ൯ߠ஻஼ െ ܭ																																																			ሺ2.8ሻ 
                                                 
16 The interval on the right of (2.6) is larger, and the assumption in that sense more plausible, the greater is 
the excess of the proportionate loss of income from bounding, ߛ, over the tax rate T. 
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(so that those indifferent between bounding and concealing prefer the latter to adjusting). 
This provides a useful benchmark case in which all three types of behavior arise in 
equilibrium: 
 
PROPOSITION 1:  Given (2.8), taxpayers partition themselves as:17 
(i) Those with ܻ ൏ ܼ or ܻ ൒ ߠ஼௅ declare honestly: these are types M and L 
respectively. 
(ii) Those with ܻ ∈ ሺܼ, ߠ஺஻ሻ adjust out of the tax system: type A. 
(iii) Those with ܻ ∈ ሾߠ஺஻, ߠ஻஼ሻ are bounders: type B. 
(iv) Those with ܻ ∈ ሾߠ஻஼, ߠ஼௅ሻ are cad: type C. 
 
Proof:  It suffices to show that ߠ஼௅ ൐ ߠ஻஼ ൐ ߠ஺஻.	For the first of these inequalities, 
substituting the implication of (2.5) that ߣܶ ൌ ܶ െ Γሺߠ஼௅ሻ into (2.3) and rearranging 
gives 
 
ሾΓሺߠ஼௅ሻ െ Γሺߠ஻஼ሻሿߠ஻஼ ൌ ሺܶ െ ߛሻߠ஻஼ െ ܭ	.																																							ሺ2.7ሻ 
 
Since Γ is increasing, the result then follows from (2.7). For the second inequality, 
suppose to the contrary that ߠ஻஼ ൏ ߠ஺஻.  Then, from (2.2), ሺ1 െ ߛሻߠ஻஼ ൏ ܼ and (2.3) 
implies 
 
൫1 െ ߣܶ െ Γሺߠ஻஼ሻ൯ߠ஻஼ െ ܭ ൏ ܼ,																																																			ሺ2.8ሻ 
  
which violates (2.8). 
 
The outcome, given a threshold as in (2.8), is thus as in Figure 1, with taxpayers’ choices 
leading to a sharp partitioning by size in which all forms of compliance and non-
compliance arise over some range.  Those with the highest potential incomes are fully 
compliant and do not adjust their real behavior; those just below conceal some of their 
income, those below that opt out of the tax net, the next adjust out, and the very smallest 
do not react at all to the tax system.  
 
The neatness of this partitioning of course reflects the underlying parameter assumptions, 
and one would not expect compliance behaviors to be so mechanically associated with 
potential income in practice, but to be shaped also by various forms of heterogeneity.  
The pattern is, nonetheless, broadly plausible and will likely have a ring of truth with 
practitioners.  While we know of no evidence allowing the identification of all such types 
of behavior in relation to a single tax, there is increasing evidence of their potential 
importance.  Chatterjee and Wingender (2012) and Kleven and Waseem (2013), for 
instance find bunching below notches in India and Pakistan respectively, while Onji 
(2009) detects VAT threshold effects on the distribution of firm size in Japan.  The extent 
of ‘bounding’ is less well-documented.  Some of this will be reflected in the bunching 
just described, as false declarations below the threshold, but in other cases it will simply 
                                                 
17 As a tie breaker, we assume that those indifferent between regimes select that preferred by those with 
slightly higher incomes. 
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result in taxpayers disappearing from sight.  Thus Erard and Ho (2001) find that about 7 
percent of the liable population in the U.S. fail to file, while results for Cameroon in 
Gauthier and Gersovitz (1997) imply that about 15 percent of 
 
Figure 1: A partition of taxpayers by compliance 
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the firms in their sample were tax evaders who had had no contact with the tax 
authorities.  There is thus good reason to suppose that all five forms of response do 
indeed occur, and can be significant. 
 
Implications 
 
One consequence of the compliance partitioning of taxpayers into the five groups shown 
in Figure 1 is a nuancing of the notion of a ‘missing middle’ in the distribution of firm 
size, which has long seen as a feature of developing counties in particular (see for 
instance Tybout, 2000).  The variety of behaviors displayed here means that this idea 
needs to be interpreted with some care, and a distinction made, in principle, between 
three distinct distributions of income:  the true, that reported to the tax authorities, and 
that which may be reported by other agencies (through production surveys, for instance).  
 
There is clearly, for instance, a ‘hole’ above the threshold—in all three distributions—in 
the sense that all those with potential incomes mass between Z and ߠ஺஻ choose (perfectly 
legally) to reduce their incomes to (just below) the threshold.  But that is not the end of 
the story.  Some bounders may choose to earn (but not declare to the tax authorities) 
incomes lying within this range, going some way towards filling up the hole in the 
distribution of true incomes; but others are likely to be either entirely absent from 
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recorded data or to falsely amplify the mass observed below the threshold.  At the same 
time, some of those with potential incomes above ߠ஻஼ may (falsely) report incomes 
within the region of potential incomes associated with adjusting or bounding.  Indeed 
Kleven and Waseem (2103) find that half or more of their sample of self-employed filers 
in Pakistan declare in dominated ranges over which (even ignoring the saving in 
compliance costs) adjusting out of the system would increase net income (though their 
interpretation is in terms of optimization frictions rather than concealment).  The varieties 
of non-compliance thus imply a series of subtleties for tax-based approaches to thinking 
about and identifying a ‘missing middle,’ as well as understanding the various bunches 
and holes, true and false, that might arise. 
 
More directly related to the concerns raised in the Introduction is the perspective that the 
partitioning in Figure 1 provides on ideas of informality.  Who, to begin with, might one 
call ‘informal’ in this partitioning?  Those in group L are both liable to tax and fully 
compliant, so they would presumably be judged to be ‘formal.’  Taking ‘informality’ to be 
the complement of formality, those in groups M, A, B and C would then be the ‘informal.’  
Thus defined, informality embraces quite distinct types of both non-compliance (bounders 
and cads; B and C) and compliance (micro and adjusters; M and A).  
 
What is of particular interest here is how the extent and nature of this informality is 
affected by the tax threshold Z.  Strikingly, since (recalling (2.5)) the critical boundary 
ߠ஼௅ is independent of Z, a (small) change in the threshold has no effect on the overall 
number of informal individuals—in the sense that it has no impact on the total number in 
groups M, A, B and C.  What it does affect, however, is the composition of that aggregate 
informality:  as is evident from Figure 1, a small increase in Z will increase the number of 
adjusters but reduce the number of bounders by exactly the same amount. And that, as 
will be seen, generally means a change in the overall output of informal firms.  Similarly, 
since (from (2.3)) a small change in the threshold has no effect on ߠ஻஼, it has no effect on 
tax revenue.  But such a change does affect welfare, nonetheless, because of the induced 
change in private output. The composition of informality—the balance, that is, between 
different forms of compliance and non-compliance—matters for policy design.  
 
All of this raises the question, to which we now turn:  Given the complexity of its effects, 
what is the optimal level of the threshold Z, and what does that imply for the optimal 
structure and nature of ‘informality’?  
 
 
III.   Optimal Thresholds 
To explore the optimal choice of threshold—and the optimal partitioning of taxpayers it 
implies—we now dispense with the assumption in (2.8).  Expositionally, however, it 
proves convenient to begin the analysis by imagining that the threshold is initially set at a 
level which satisfies (2.8).  
 
Leaving equity considerations aside, the object of policy is taken to be the maximization 
of the sum of private incomes and net tax revenue, with the latter weighted by some 
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factor ߜ ൐ 1 that can be thought of as the marginal cost of public funds raised from other 
instruments available to the government, or simply as the marginal value of public 
spending.  Introducing now fixed costs of administration, incurred by the government for 
all those remitting tax,18 denoted by N, social welfare, given the partition in Proposition 
1, is  
 
ܹሺܼሻ ൌ න ܻ݂ሺܻሻܻ݀ ൅ ܼሼܨሾߠ஺஻ሺܼሻሿ െ ܨሺܼሻሽ
௓
଴
൅ ሺ1 െ ߛሻන ܻ݂ሺܻሻܻ݀																							
ఏಳ಴
ఏಲಳሺ௓ሻ
 
൅න ܻ݂ሺܻሻܻ݀
ஶ
ఏಳ಴
൅ න ሼሺߜ െ 1ሻߣܻܶ െ ܭ െ ߜܰሽ
ఏ಴ಽ
ఏಳ಴
݂ሺܻሻܻ݀ 
																						൅න ሼሺߜ െ 1ሻܻܶ െ ܭ െ ߜܰሽ
ஶ
ఏ಴ಽ
݂ሺܻሻܻ݀				.																																																					ሺ3.1ሻ 
 
This is messy, but straightforward.  The first four terms give the output of small non-
adjusters (type M), adjusters (type A), bounders (type B), and (combined) concealers and 
fully compliant taxpayers (types C and L). The fifth and sixth give the social gain from 
the transfer from individuals to government of tax payments, net of administration, and 
compliance costs.  Note that the cost incurred by concealers, Γሺܻሻܻ,	is treated as a 
transfer, and so does not appear in W; as will be seen, this is inessential to the qualitative 
results. 
 
A useful benchmark for thinking about the optimal threshold in this context is provided 
by the analysis in Keen and Mintz (2004) of the choice of Z when compliance is perfect 
and there are no behavioral responses.  In this case, the social cost of a marginal increase 
in the threshold is the social value of the revenue foregone, ߜܼ݂ܶሺܼሻ.  The marginal 
social benefit, on the other hand, is the saving in administrative cost to the government 
and the saving to the private sector in compliance costs and tax paid, ሺߜܰ ൅ ܭ ൅
ܼܶሻ݂ሺܼሻ.  Equating the two, the optimal threshold in this simple setting is given by 
 
ܼ௄ெ ൌ ߜܰ ൅ ܭሺߜ െ 1ሻܶ			.																																																																	ሺ3.2ሻ 
 
This convenient closed form, notably independent of the distribution of taxable income, 
has proved simple enough to provide practical guidance for policy.19  It also serves as a 
useful benchmark for thinking about the optimal threshold in the richer (and more 
realistic) environment considered here, in which taxpayers have available to them a 
variety of behavioral responses.  The issue, most simply put—and with relevance to 
                                                 
18 This is certainly a simplistic view of administrative activity, which would, for example, appropriately 
also involve verifying claims of income below the threshold. But it captures a central cost concern of any 
tax administration. (Goyette (2012) provides an intriguing analysis of how the VAT threshold is 
implemented in Uganda, finding it to be focused more on employment than the turnover test by which the 
requirement to register is formally defined). 
19 Ebrill et al (2001) discuss and illustrate the applicability of this result.  (In its original form, focused 
directly on the VAT, this also includes in the denominator the ratio of value added to sales, since value 
added is the effective base when a firm whose suppliers are subject to VAT is itself brought into the VAT). 
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practical advice in this area—is whether these argue for a higher or a lower threshold 
than the Keen-Mintz threshold ܼ௄ெ. 
 
Returning to the problem of maximizing (3.1), one sharp result emerges quickly.  Recall 
first from (2.3) and (2.5) that ߠ஻஼	and ߠ஼௅ are independent of Z.  Then, as discussed after 
Figure 1, the only effect of a small increase in the threshold is to increase the number of 
adjusters and reduce the number of bounders by exactly the same amount.  Private output, 
however, does change.  Differentiating (3.1) gives 
 
ܹᇱሺܼሻ ൌ ܼ݂ሺܼሻ ൅ 	ܨሺߠ஺஻ሻ െ ܨሺܼሻ ൅ ܼሼ݂ሺߠ஺஻ሻߠ஺஻ᇱ െ ݂ሺܼሻሽെ ሺ1 െ ߛሻߠ஺஻ᇱ ߠ஺஻݂ሺߠ஺஻ሻ							 
 
ൌ ܨሺߠ஺஻ሻ െ ܨሺܼሻ ൐ 0			,																																																																																													ሺ3.3ሻ 
 
the second equality following on cancelling terms and noting from (2.2) that ߠ஺஻ᇱ ൌ1/ሺ1 െ ߛሻ, and the inequality from ߠ஺஻ ൐ ܼ.  Starting from the situation of Proposition 1, 
it is thus optimal to raise the threshold until ߠ஺஻ rises above ߠ஻஼, and a different partition 
applies. Thus  
 
PROPOSITION 2:  It is optimal to set the threshold sufficiently high to eliminate 
bounding. 
 
The intuition for this strong result—which, unlike others to come, requires no assumption 
on the shape of the distribution of income—is straightforward.  A unit increase in the 
threshold allows the ܨሺߠ஺஻ሻ െ ܨሺܼሻ taxpayers bunched just below it to each produce one 
unit more.  It also induces those just on the margin between bounding and adjusting to 
switch from the former (producing ሺ1 െ ߛሻߠ஺஻ሻ to the latter (producing Z); but their 
initial indifference between the two means that this has a negligible impact on their 
output.  Thus only the unambiguous increase in the output of the adjusters remains, 
making it optimal to eliminate bounders entirely.  Of course, the starkness of this result 
reflects the simplicity of the underlying structure:  one might in practice expect some 
degree of heterogeneity, not modeled here, to result in differing forms of behavior within 
each income.  Nonetheless, in so far as the partitioning in Proposition 1 seems to have an 
element of truth in describing reality, so too will this implication for optimal policy.  
 
Beyond its technical content, Proposition 2 has lessons for the discourse on informality. It 
emphasizes that the composition of informality matters for policy, since the beneficial 
elimination of bounders through the increased threshold is simply converting them into 
adjusters, with no change in the number of informal operators. And that matters, of 
course, because there is an impact on aggregate output, which stresses another point: 
reforms that increase informality, in the sense of leading to higher output in the informal 
sector, may well be desirable.  
 
Building on Proposition 2, the elimination of bounders simplifies the optimization 
problem. But it helps to approach what remains in stages. 
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For this, suppose first that there is no concealing, so that—bounding having been 
optimally removed—the focus is on how best to respond to the possibility of adjusting.20 
All those with maximum potential income below Z will simply report that income.  Those 
with higher potential income compare their net income if they earn and declare their 
maximum income, ሺ1 െ ܶሻܻ െ ܭ	to that if they adjust to (just below) the threshold, and 
so will adjust if and only if their potential income is less than 
 
ߠ஺௅ሺܼሻ ≡ ܭ ൅ ܼ1 െ ܶ ൐ ܼ,																																																								ሺ3.4ሻ 
 
which it will prove helpful to think of as an ‘effective’ threshold: ߠ஺௅ሺܼሻ is the lowest 
income on which (in the circumstances now being assumed) any tax is actually paid. 
Social welfare is in this case simply 
 
ܹሺܼሻ ൌ න ܻ݂ሺܻሻܻ݀ െ
ஶ
଴
න ሺܻ െ ܼሻ݂ሺܻሻܻ݀
ఏಲಽሺ௓ሻ
௓
																																																 
 
൅ሺߜ െ 1ሻܶන ሺܻ െ ܼ௄ெሻ݂ሺܻሻܻ݀																																						ሺ3.5ሻ
ஶ
ఏಲಽሺ௓ሻ
 
 
using having been made of (3.2) to facilitate comparison with the KM threshold.  The 
first order condition on the choice of Z then gives: 
 
PROPOSITION 3: In the absence of concealing, at a local optimum: 21 
 
									ܹᇱሺܼሻ ൌ െሺߜ െ 1ሻܶߠ஺௅ᇱ ሺܼሻሺߠ஺௅ 	െ ܼ௄ெሻ݂ሺߠ஺௅ሻ																																																						 
 
																																െ	ሺߠ஺௅ െ ܼሻߠ஺௅ᇱ ሺܼሻ݂ሺߠ஺௅ሻ ൅ ൣܨ൫ߠ஺௅ሺܼሻ൯ െ ܨሺܼሻ൧ 		ൌ 0											ሺ3.6ሻ 
 
where, from (3.4), 
ߠ஺௅ᇱ ሺܼሻ ൌ 11 െ ܶ																																																															ሺ3.7ሻ 
 
 
A first lesson from Proposition 3 is that it is now the effective threshold, ߠ஺௅, that is most 
readily related to the benchmark KM threshold, not the statutory threshold Z itself (the 
latter being inferred from the former, from (3.4))—which is a natural perspective to take, 
since it is around the effective threshold that behavioral responses occur.  A second is 
                                                 
20 This, it should be noted, is a simplified version of the most general problem considered in Keen and 
Mintz (2004), which goes further in taking account of taxed inputs and allowing output to depend on a 
labor input to which some disutility is attached. 
21 Using ߠᇱᇱሺܼሻ ൌ 0	and simplifying, the second order condition is that  
																																												ܹᇱᇱሺܼሻ ൌ ݂ሺߠሻߠᇱሺ1 െ ߠᇱሻ െ ݂ሺܼሻ െ ݂ሺߠሻሺߠᇱሻଶ െ ሺߠ െ ܼሻ݂ᇱሺߠሻߠᇱ	< 0, 
for which it is sufficient that ݂ᇱሺߠሻ ൐ 0. 
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that, in contrast to the benchmark KM case, the optimal threshold is now sensitive to the 
underlying distribution of firm size. 
 
To see more precisely the intuition for the characterization in Proposition 3, suppose that 
the effective threshold is initially set at the KM level.  The first term on the right of (3.6) 
then vanishes:  by exactly the same argument as underlying (3.4), the welfare impacts on 
revenue and on costs of compliance and administration of slightly raising the threshold 
net out to zero. But now there are also effects on real output.  A marginal increase in the 
statutory threshold raises the effective threshold by (omitting the subscripts) ߠᇱሺܼሻ, and 
the ߠᇱሺܼሻ݂ሺߠሻ individuals affected by this each cut their output by ߠ െ ܼ; this is a source 
of loss captured by the second term on the right of (3.6). Another effect of the higher 
threshold, however, is that it enables the ܨሺߠሻ െ ܨሺܼሻ individuals just below the 
threshold to each produce one unit more; which is a source of social gain captured in the 
third term on the right.  Whether the effective threshold should optimally be set above or 
below ܼ௄ெ thus depends on the balance between these two effects.  
 
This in turn is closely related to the concavity of convexity of the distribution function 
ܨሺܻሻ, as can be seen by using (3.7) to rewrite (3.6) as 
 
ߠ஺௅ െ ܼ௄ெ ൌ ൬1 െ ܶߜ െ 1൰ܩሺߠ஺௅, ܼሻ 		െ ൬
ܶ
ߜ െ 1൰ ݂ሺߠ஺௅ሻሺߠ஺௅ െ ܼሻ																							ሺ3.8ሻ 
 
where 
ܩሺߠ, ܼሻ ≡ ൬ 1݂ሺߠሻ൰ ൫ܨሺߠሻ െ ܨሺܼሻ െ ሺߠ െ ܼሻ݂ሺߠሻ൯			.																																					ሺ3.9ሻ 
 
Hence, recalling from (3.4) that ߠ஺௅ ൐ ܼ and confining attention, for brevity, to the case 
in which F is everywhere either concave or convex: 
 
 
PROPOSITION 4: In the absence of concealing, it is necessary but not sufficient 
(respectively, sufficient but not necessary) for the optimal statutory threshold to be 
greater (less) than ܼ௄ெat a local optimum that F be strictly concave (weakly convex).  
 
Whether the optimal response to the possibility of adjusting in itself points to a lower or a 
higher threshold than in the benchmark case—and so to more or less informality—is thus 
unclear without further restrictions on the size distribution.  The most plausible case is 
that in which the density is decreasing over the relevant range, so that F is concave. 
Responding to adjustment may then mean setting a threshold higher than would 
otherwise be the case. 22  
 
Returning to the general case in which there may be concealing as well as adjusting 
(bounders having been optimally eliminated), welfare can be written as 
                                                 
22 The simulations in Keen and Mintz (2004), for the more complex of their settings noted above, indeed 
find thresholds optimally higher than ܼ௄ெ; and not only for concave F but also for uniform (which in the 
present framework implies an optimal threshold unambiguously lower). 
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ܹሺܼሻ ൌ න ܻ݂ሺܻሻܻ݀ െ
ஶ
଴
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௓
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൅ሺߜ െ 1ሻܶන ሺܻ െ ܼ௄ெሻ݂ሺܻሻܻ݀																															ሺ3.10ሻ
ఏ಴ಽ
ఏಲ಴ሺ௓ሻ
 
 
where ߠ஺஼ሺܼሻ is the cut-off income between adjusting and concealing, implicitly defined 
by 
 
ሺ1 െ ߣܶ െ Γሺߠ஺஼ሻሻߠ஺஼ െ ܭ ൌ ܼ	.																																																						ሺ3.11ሻ 
 
Noting that ߠ஼௅ is independent of Z, differentiating in (3.10) gives 
 
 
PROPOSITION 5:  At a local optimum, 
 
ሺߜ െ 1ሻܶߠ஺஼ᇱ ݂ሺߠ஺஼ሻ ቆߠ஺஼ െ ܼ
௄ெ
ߣ ቇ
ൌ െߠ஺஼ᇱ ሺߠ஺஼ െ ܼሻ݂ሺߠ஺஼ሻ ൅ ሾܨሺߠ஺஼ሻ െ ܨሺܼሻሿ		.						ሺ3.12ሻ 
 
 where 
ߠ஺஼ᇱ ൌ 11 െ ߣܶߠ஺஼ െ ߁ሺߠ஺஼ሻ െ ሺߣܶ ൅ Γᇱሺߠ஺஼ሻߠ஺஼ሻ 	൐ 1																													ሺ3.13ሻ 
 
 
The characterization of the optimal threshold in this most general case is evidently 
similar to that in Proposition 4.  The two terms on the right of (3.12) are analogous to the 
final two on the right of (3.6) and again reflect the shaping of the threshold to address the 
possibility of adjusting (the difference being that now those on the margin of adjusting 
are the concealers, whereas in Proposition 4 they were type L’s).  More fundamentally, 
on the left of (3.12) the effective threshold is now being compared not directly to the 
benchmark threshold ܼ௄ெ but to ܼ௄ெ/ߣ; which, since ߣ ൏ 1, is strictly larger.  In this 
sense (and independent of the distribution of firms size), responding optimally to 
concealers calls for setting the threshold higher than would otherwise be the case.  Indeed 
it can be shown, in similar spirit, that the optimal statutory threshold is decreasing in ߣ;23 
is lower, that is, the greater the proportion of income that is declared.  This is readily 
explained. Returning to the logic underlying the benchmark KM result in (3.2), when 
individuals declare only a proportion their income, the revenue impact is as if they fully 
declared but paid at a rate of ߣܶ.  Applying that same logic then implies a threshold of 
ܼ௄ெ/ߣ:  the threshold is optimally set higher simply because the revenue loss from 
raising it is less than it would be if all those paying tax were fully compliant. 
                                                 
23 The proof, which is cumbersome, is omitted. 
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It is clear from these results that setting an optimal threshold becomes much more 
complex when account is taken of the various forms of compliance and non-compliance 
that are the commonplace of tax implementation.  It requires balancing considerations 
whose relative force likely varies widely both across countries and over time.  Where 
taxpayers are broadly honest, whether by inclination or by features of design and 
administration, the main additional concern is with the possibility of some avoiding tax 
by legitimately adjusting below the threshold.  The implications of this for the level of the 
threshold are sensitive to the shape of size distribution of firms, but may plausibly point 
to a higher threshold than otherwise.  Where, however, evasion is the dominant 
concern—whether in the form of bounders or concealment—the implication is somewhat 
more clear-cut, the analysis here pointing to a higher threshold than would otherwise be 
optimal.  To the extent that evasion can be expected to be a greater concern in lower 
income economies, with less well-developed revenue administrations, this suggests that, 
all else equal, thresholds should optimally be higher there.  Of course all else (including 
the distribution of firm size) is not equal.  It is of some interest, nonetheless, that Figure 
2, which plots VAT thresholds relative to per capita income against per capita income 
(both in logs) suggests that this is indeed quite broadly the case in practice 
 
 
Figure 2.  VAT thresholds and per capita income, 2012 
 
 
 
Note: Author’s calculations using VAT thresholds from IMF compilation and per capita 
income from the World Economic Outlook.   
 
 
 
20
IV.   Multiple Obligations and Thresholds 
In practice, individuals and firms commonly face not just one potential tax (or other 
obligation), as assumed so far, but several—each with its associated threshold.24  These 
may relate to different dimensions of behavior: labor law requirements, for instance, are 
often defined in terms of number of employees, while tax obligations are arise when 
income or turnover exceed some limits.  Or they may relate to the same dimension: tax 
systems may, for example, use threshold levels of turnover not only to define the 
obligation to register for the VAT but also to mark the transition between various forms 
of income tax (some form of presumptive tax for the smallest, in many cases, with 
transition to full accrual-based taxation for the largest).25  
 
While notches, kinks and thresholds have received considerable attention in recent years, 
the interplay between the many such features that are faced in reality has not.  They can 
clearly greatly complicate individuals’ and firms’ decisions: choosing to bunch below the 
notch for one obligation, for example, will generally have implications for liability under 
others.  An Indian manufacturing firm that chooses to hire more than 9 employees, for 
instance, and so become subject to the Factories Act, may consequently find it less 
attractive to maintain its turnover below the 10,000 rupees at which it is required to 
charge Central Excise Duty.  This in turn makes policy makers’ design problem in setting 
thresholds still harder—and, as in this example, may call for coordination between 
agencies that have quite different mandates but whose decisions affect the same 
individuals and firms.  
 
One very practical issue that arises is whether there is merit in setting the threshold for 
different obligations or treatment at the same level, as sometimes seems to be presumed. 
One strategy recommended for the treatment of small businesses, for instance, has been 
to set a common turnover threshold for both the VAT and some form of self-assessment 
under the income tax (International Tax Dialogue, 2007). 
 
To begin exploring some of the implications of multiple obligations and thresholds, 
suppose now that firms face two distinct taxes, each with the same structure as above, 
indicated by subscripts 1 and 2.  These may differ in all respects: tax rate, threshold and 
implementation costs.  (But they need not: indeed the case in which they are identical is 
an important benchmark, in that if each were then set in isolation of the other, they would 
indeed be given the same threshold—which poses crisply the question of whether that is 
indeed optimal when the interactions between them are recognized).  These two taxes 
might be thought of, for instance, as the VAT and an income tax, with an assumption of a 
fixed relationship between income and turnover enabling the two to be expressed in the 
same common unit of sales.  Less literally—but as a step away from the blinkered 
perspective of looking only at some subset of the many obligations firms may face—the 
framework might also be thought of as reflecting tax and non-tax obligations (such as 
                                                 
24 Note that the concern here is with multiple obligations, not with a single obligation that may take 
different forms (such as quarterly versus annual reporting for the VAT). 
25 See for instance the description of small business tax regimes in Inter-American Development Bank 
(2013) 
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factory act requirements), with the private and social costs and benefits of the latter 
translated into tax-equivalent terms. 
 
Leaving a general treatment to future work, we shall simply suppose that all firms are 
intrinsically honest: there are no bounders or concealers, so the only behavioral concern 
is adjusting.  Without loss of generality, we also assume that ܼଵ ൑ ܼଶ; so the only options 
that the taxpayer has are to pay both taxes, pay only 1, or pay neither. Broadly two types 
of partition can then arise.  
 
The first arises when ܼଶ is sufficiently close to ܼଵ that ܭଵ ൅ ଵܼܶଶ ൐ ܼଶ െ ܼଵ ൐ 0. Then 
 
ሺ1 െ ଵܶሻܼଶ െ ܭଵ ൑ ܼଵ																																																					ሺ4.1ሻ 
 
and all those declaring under the threshold for 2 but above that for 1 would find it still 
better to declare under the threshold for 1:  intuitively, the threshold for 2 is so low as to 
be in the ‘hole’ just above the threshold for 1.  The only relevant choice is then that 
between paying both taxes and paying none.  Using an absence of subscripts to indicate 
addition over both taxes (so that ܶ ≡ ଵܶ ൅ ଶܶ, and so on), the critical level of income 
below (above) which it is privately best to pay neither tax (both taxes) is then given by26 
 
ߠ ≡ ܭ ൅ ܼଵ1 െ ܶ 																																																																				ሺ4.2ሻ 
 
The outcome is thus as in the top panel of Figure 3:  a single, large mass of firms just 
below the lower statutory threshold, above which there is a single hole extending above 
the higher threshold, with neither tax being paid until an effective threshold is reached, 
above both thresholds, at which point both are paid.  We refer to this as a Type I 
partition. 
 
For the second possibility, suppose now that the thresholds satisfy the converse of (4.1), 
so that ܼଶ	lies outside the hole associated with tax 1.  Among those with potential income 
below ܼଶ, those with income less than 
 
ߠଵ ≡ ܭଵ ൅ ܼଵ1 െ ଵܶ 																																																																						ሺ4.3ሻ 
  
will adjust to below ܼଵ; the rest will pay tax 1.27  The fundamental difference from the 
previous case, however, is that for those above ܼଶ it will be better to adjust out of tax 2 
only than to adjust out of both.  More precisely, they will choose to adjust out of tax 2 
(only) rather than pay both if and only if their income is below the level ߠଶ at which  
 
ሺ1 െ ܶሻߠଶ െ ܭ ൌ ሺ1 െ ଵܶሻܼଶ െ ܭଵ	; 																																																	ሺ4.4ሻ 
 
                                                 
26 That ߠ ൐ ܼଶ, as drawn (and used in proving Proposition 6 below) follows from (4.2) and (4.1). 
27 That ߠଵ ൏ ܼଶ follows from (4.3) and the negation of (4.2). 
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that is, below28 
ߠଶ ൌ ሺ1 െ ଵܶሻܼଶ ൅ ܭଶ1 െ ܶ 			.																																																							ሺ4.5ሻ 
 
The second possibility is thus as in the lower panel of Figure 3:  now there is a mass of 
firms just below, and a hole above, each threshold. We call this a Type II partition. 
 
Figure 3: Partitions with two obligations 
 
Adjust out of both 1 and 2 Pay  both 1 and 2

2Z1Z *
1Z 2Z
Type I:  Thresholds close
1 2
Pay  both 
1 and 2Adjust out of 2, pay 1
Pay only 1 
(no adjustment)Adjust out of 1
Type II:  Thresholds far apart
mass
massmass
 
The question then arises as to whether these very different forms of partition can be 
welfare-ranked. Is it better to set the thresholds for distinct obligations at the same or 
similar levels, generating a large mass below the lower of the two (Type I), or to set them 
far enough apart to induce some mass below both thresholds (Type II)?  The following 
establishes that the latter is preferred under quite a weak condition: 
 
PROPOSITION 6:  For given ܼଵ, if ଵܼܶଵ ൐ ଵܰ then it is optimal to set ܼଶ	high enough to 
induce a partition of type II. 
 
Proof: See appendix. 
 
This finding that a marked dissimilarity of thresholds is optimal—even, it should be 
noted, if all aspects of the two instruments are identical—points to the importance of the 
interplay between distinct obligations.  To see the logic, suppose that the thresholds of a 
VAT and a Factory Act are calibrated to apply at roughly the same levels of activity, so 
that initially firms comply with either both or neither, with a large mass below the 
common threshold.  Then by raising the threshold for the Factory Act sufficiently (from, 
                                                 
28 That ߠଶ ൐ ܼଶ follows from (4.5) and ଶܶ ൐ 0. 
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say, 10 workers to 20) some firms will be induced to so increase their scale (from 9, say, 
to 19) that while continuing to remain out of the Factory Act it becomes worth their while 
to become subject to VAT.  In this way, raising the threshold for one obligation 
eventually induces a mass of firms into compliance with the other obligation; thus it is 
that the condition in Proposition 6 for the significantly higher threshold for tax 2 to be 
optimal turns on the net tax receipts from the other tax, 1. 
 
A different conclusion might be reached, of course, if there were some economies of 
scope in complying with or administering the different obligations; and there is of course 
some merit of simplicity in having fewer thresholds rather than more.  What emerges 
clearly, however, is the importance of recognizing the multiplicity of obligations to which 
firms are generally subject, and the interplay between them.  At one level, this raises yet 
more issues that the simple language of informality can hardly cope with: in the example 
above, for instance, it may well be that, even at an optimum, some firms are ‘formal’ with 
respect to obligation 1 but ‘informal’ in relation to obligation 2.  More fundamentally, it 
points to a treatment of partition issues that looks holistically at the full set of obligations 
placed on firms.  This perspective appears to be as absent from policy making as it has 
been from the formal literature.  And it opens up further lines for enquiry.  It might be, 
for instance, that each agency, in setting thresholds related to its own sphere of interest, 
neglects the impact on aspects of compliance of interest to other agencies, with 
consequent inefficiencies that a more coherent approach could avoid. 
 
 
V.   Concluding 
The simple models of this paper, and the characterizations and propositions to which they 
gives rise, highlight a number of important issues in the current literature on taxation and 
informality.  
 
First, the results above make clear that the term ‘informal’ as used in the literature is 
imprecise and can be very misleading.  What the models reveal, and what is surely true in 
practice, is a range of compliant and non-compliant behaviors which are often and 
unthinkingly lumped together as a single entity under the label of ‘informality.’  As we 
have shown, a key policy instrument like the tax threshold can have an impact on social 
welfare primarily through intricate effects on the composition of informality rather than 
through its overall level.  Among the results is one with a practical implication: where 
concerns on evasion are stronger, as for example in many developing countries, there is 
an argument for tax thresholds to be set higher than they would be in the absence of 
behavioral response. 
 
Second, the paper has highlighted an issue which has not received the attention it surely 
deserves.  When firms and individuals face multiple forms of tax and non-tax obligations 
with different thresholds, quite complex patterns of compliance, adjustment and evasion 
can be generated. Specifically, firms can choose to adjust out of some obligations but not 
others.  How should thresholds be set in such a setting?  The simple analysis of this 
paper, with two obligations and two thresholds, points to quite a rich set of possibilities. 
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For example increasing the threshold for one tax obligation may induce firms, even if 
they continue to remain below that threshold, to cease adjusting out of the other--which 
may give rise to social gain.  A rich research agenda awaits, including tackling issues of 
coordination across different agencies which manage the different tax and non-tax 
obligations. 
 
The analysis here has many limitations, of course, notably in the somewhat mechanical 
modeling of opportunities to evade tax, which ignores, not least, the element of risk that 
has featured prominently in much of the literature29  The treatment has also been very 
partial, in the sense that it has focused on just one policy instrument—the threshold—
when the analysis itself makes clear than many others, including tax structure and 
enforcement strategies, have a key role in shaping the kinds of partitions with which we 
have been concerned.  It has served, nonetheless, to illustrate the potential value of the 
approach to issues of non-compliance and informality described at the outset, moving 
away from broad-brush notions of informality and towards understanding how policy 
choices induce partitions of taxpayers by the nature of their non-compliance (or 
compliance).  
 
This focus, it should be noted, resonates very strongly with current trends in the 
practicalities of revenue administration.  These are often built around notions of ‘taxpayer 
segmentation,’ implemented through organizational structures that enable distinct 
treatment of groups presenting different compliance risks.  And these, in turn, are often 
based on a simple partition by size, in many cases beginning with large taxpayer units 
and with an intention to develop subsequently medium- and small-taxpayer services.  The 
broad parallel with the partition linking size to compliance behavior established here is 
striking, so that the present analysis provides some underpinning for such an 
administrative strategy.  It may also point the way towards richer models that can help 
administrations identify, in their particular circumstances what, and where, the main 
compliance risks are likely to be.  Perhaps most important, however, the approach here 
stresses the need for a conscious simultaneity in policy design and practical segmentation 
strategies, with the former, through the choice of threshold and other instruments, 
shaping the compliance risks that the latter are intended to address. 
 
                                                 
29As a way of thinking about the VAT, the model also neglects the links between firms that recent work 
suggests can be important in propagating or curtailing forms of non-compliance under the VAT (De Paula 
and Scheinkman (2010), Pomeranz ( 2011)).   
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Appendix: Proof of Proposition 6 
 
Welfare in a type I partition is 
 
ܹ஺ሺܼଵሻ ൌ න ܻ݂ሺܻሻ݀ݕ ൅ ܼଵሼܨሺߠሻ െ ܨሺܼଵሻሽ ൅ න ܻ݂ሺܻሻܻ݀
ஶ
ఏ
௓భ
଴
 
൅න ሼሺߜ െ 1ሻܻܶ െ ߜܰ െ ܭሽ݂ሺܻሻܻ݀
ஶ
ఏ
,																																										ሺA. 1ሻ 
 
which, note, is independent of ܼଶ. In a type II partition, which, recalling (4.1), arises with 
a threshold of  
 
ܼଶሺߝሻ ൌ ܭଵ ൅ ܼଵ1 െ ଵܶ ൅ ߝ			 ≡ ܼଶ
∗ ൅ ߝ																																																									ሺA. 2ሻ 
 
for any ߝ ൐ 0, welfare is 
 
ܹ஻ሺܼଵ, ܼଶሺߝሻሻ
ൌ න ܻ݂ሺܻሻܻ݀ ൅ ܼଵሼܨሺߠଵሻ െ ܨሺܼଵሻሽ
௓భ
଴
൅ න ܻ݂ሺܻሻ݀ݕ
௓మ
ఏభ
																																							 
൅ܼଶሼܨሺߠଶሻ െ ܨሺܼଶሻሽ ൅ න ܻ݂ሺܻሻ݀ݕ
ஶ
ఏమ
൅ න ሼሺߜ െ 1ሻ ଵܻܶ െ ߜ ଵܰ െ ܭଵሽ݂ሺܻሻܻ݀
௓మ
ఏభ
 
න ሼሺߜ െ 1ሻܻܶ െ ߜܰ െ ܭሽ݂ሺܻሻܻ݀ ൅ ሼሺ
ஶ
ఏమ
ߜ െ 1ሻ ଵܼܶଶ െ ߜ ଵܰ െ ܭଵሽሼܨሺߠଵ െ ߠଶሻሽ.			ሺA. 3ሻ 
 
Noting that limఌ→଴ ߠଵ ൌߠ (from (A.2) and (4.3)) and limఌ→଴ ߠଶ ൌܼଶ (from (A.2) and 
(4.5)), subtracting (A.3) from (A.1) and taking limits gives, canceling and collecting 
terms and using (A.2), 
 
limఌ→଴ܹ஻ െܹ஺ ൌ limఌ→଴ ߜሺ ଵܼܶଶ∗ െ ଵܰሻሼܨሺߠሻ െ ܨሺܼଶ∗ሻሽ		,																																		ሺA. 4ሻ 
 
from which, since ߠ ൐ 	ܼଶ∗, as noted in the text, the result follows. 
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